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Abstract
In this work we use an inelastic scattering process of particles to pro-
pose a model able to reproduce the salient features of the wealth dis-
tribution in an economy by including taxes to each trading process and
redistributing that collected among the population according to a given
criterion. Additionally, we show that different optimal levels of taxes may
exist depending on the redistribution criterion.
1 Introduction
More than a century ago Pareto [1] proposed a law of distribution of individual
wealth in a society. It states that the tail of the wealth distribution follows a
power-law P (w) ≈ w−(1+ν). Here, P (w) is the amount of people possessing
wealth w. The exponent ν is the Pareto exponent and generally takes values
between 1 and 3 [2, 4, 5]. It is also known that for low and medium income,
P (w) decays exponentially or in a log-normal way [2, 3, 4]. Since the same
behavior was found for income distribution in a society [6, 7], in the following
and for the sake of concreteness, we will refer to “wealth”, but “income” should
be equally applicable.
As a consequence of the analysis of wealth and income distributions in different
societies from available real data [6], it is well-known now that the distribution
of the richest 5% of the population has a power-law tail [2, 4, 5], while the
majority (around 95%) low-income distribution fits well to Gibbs or log-normal
form [8].
There has been several attempts to model a simple economy [9, 10, 11, 12, 13,
14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23], which involve a wealth exchange process
that produce a distribution of wealth similar to that observed in real economies.
Most of works are particularly interested in microscopic models of markets where
the economic activity is considered as a scattering process. Special attention
have received those models centered on savings in the trading process [6, 7, 8]
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which reproduce features of real wealth distributions.
This kind of models is analogously thought as either elastically or inelastically
scattering particles. Inelastic scattering of particles was studied in the con-
text of granular materials [24, 25, 26] by the inelastic variant of the Maxwell
model [27, 28, 29, 30]. The conclusion of these studies is that a self-similar
solution of the kinetic equations exist, which is not stationary in time at in-
dividual level, but the system converges to time-independent parameters. The
model introduced here studies how inelastic binary collisions may be assumed
as the application of taxes and its redistribution can reproduce the salient fea-
tures of empirical distributions of wealth without regard to, in principle, any
another consideration. Based on the mentioned saving models and from the
majority log-normal distribution point of view, we propose a simple granular
closed-system model in which the collisions are inelastic and the loss of energy is
eventually redistributed among the particles of the system according to certain
“state” criterion.
A parallel aim of this work is to evaluate the response of the simple model when
the scope of feasible rules is extended to include taxes, specially related to in-
come distribution, according to realistic observations.
2 The model
Imagine a closed economic system with total amount of money (wealth) W
and total number N of agents, both constant. It is, neither production nor
death/birth of agents occurs. The only economic activity is confined to trading.
Agent i, possess a wealth wi(t) at time t. Time changes after each trading. Any
trading involves two steps: first, two randomly chosen agents i and j exchange
their money in “inelastic” way such that a fraction of their exchanged wealth is
lost by taxes (Figure 1):
wi(t+
1
2
) = (1− f)ǫij(wi(t) + wj(t))
wj(t+
1
2
) = (1− f)(1− ǫij)(wi(t) + wj(t))
wi(t+
1
2
) + wj(t+
1
2
) = (1− f)(wi(t) + wj(t))
wk(t+
1
2
) = wk(t) for k 6= i, j
where wi(t), wj(t), wk(t) ≥ 0 for all i, j, k and t, f is the fraction of trading lost
by taxes and ǫi,j is a random fraction (0 ≤ ǫi,j ≤ 1). Secondly, taxes are redis-
tributed among individuals according to certain rule (i.e., equally distributed
among the population, distributed among the poorest fraction, etc.):
wr(t+ 1) = wr(t+
1
2
) +
{
f
|S| (wi(t) + wj(t)), ∀r ∈ S
0, otherwise
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Figure 1: Schematic picture of the first step of the scattering process. Agents i
and j exchange their wealth in the economy and pay taxes for their exchanges,
which are redistributed among the population.
for S being the subset of population benefited by the redistribution policy;
conserving the total wealth W =
∑
i
N
wi(t). From now on, we will use P (w)
normalized as a probability distribution function of wealth w.
As we can see here, at f = 0 the steady-state wealth distribution of the economy
becomes a Gibbs’ one as reported in [31], with modal value wm = 0. For S = N
and f 6= 0 (i.e., when all the agents are equally benefited by the redistribution),
the equilibrium distribution becomes asymmetric unimodal with wm of P (w)
shifting away from wm = 0, reaching a maximum wm and moving back to
wm = 0 as f −→ 1, as shown in Figure 2.a. In this organization of the economy
induced by taxes with a global egalitarian perspective is very significant the way
in which the fraction of paupers decreases until certain level of taxes and most
people end up close to the average wealth in the economy.
In this sense, slopes of the log-normal cumulative probability Q(w), defined as
Q(w) =
∫∞
w
P (w′)dw′, for the after-mode part P (w) in Figure 2.b decrease as
taxes increase, attaining a minimum and then increasing with taxes tending to
behave as to f = 0. The modal value of wealth distribution seems to behave on a
contrary way, according to Figure 2.a. Both figures may suggest an optimal level
of taxes, in which the distribution is relatively more egalitarian. Figures 3.a and
3.b show modal wealths wm of P (w) and slopes of log-normal Q(w) as a function
of f , respectively. Besides, we consider the case in which the money collected by
taxes is selectively redistributed. Figures 3.c and 3.d show the modal values wm
of P (w) and P (w), respectively, when that money is uniformly redistributed
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Figure 2: a) Wealth distribution P (w) and b) cumulative probability Q(w) for
different taxes f ; N = 1000 and average wealth W/N = 1.
among the subset S conformed by the 20% poorest of the population. Note
from Figure 3.c that wm ≥ 1 for f ≥ 0.3. This fact suggests that a huge
majority belong to the richest portion of the population and a few individuals
belong to the poorest one, shown in Figure 3.d. As a consequence, the wealth of
the multitudinarious richest portion is slightly grater than the average wealth
W/N = 1, getting closer to a socialist distribution.
3 Conclusions
We proposed a new rule for the simple binary trading model in the search
of adding further complexities, which might appear in real economies. Be-
sides, by this work we evaluated the robustness of that model for allowing other
potentially-realistic rules, holding the same qualitative behavior. In this case, a
granular model was analyzed in which inelastic binary collisions were consider
in a closed system where the after-collision lost energy is captured by the mole-
cules in it with the aim of emulating taxes paid in each trade operation and then
redistributed by the corresponding State. Observations have been made about
the wealth distribution obtained fitted as a log-normal one. The optimum level
of taxes f ∼= 0.325 shows a more egalitarian economy for a model with non-
selective redistribution. In the case where the redistribution is focused on the
poorest individuals we observed a significant majority with wealth around the
average one.
Further research in this sense should be centered in an analytical treatment of
the model and in more complex instances which include simultaneously taxes
into the well-known models of saving propensity, binary trading according to
the possibilities of the poorest agent of both, evasion propensity according to
level of taxes, etc., in order to get models from a comprising conception.
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Figure 3: a) Modal values of wealth distribution P (w) and b) slopes of log-
normal curves of Q(w) as a function of f . c) Modal values of wealth distribution
P (w) when taxes are redistributed among the 20% poorest of the population
and d) P (w) as a function of f ; N = 1000, and average wealth W/N = 1.
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